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ABSTRACT
The evaluations of a repeated lottery with and without the option to sell the second-stage lottery are
compared theoretically and experimentally. Comparing individuals’risk attitudes, we ﬁnd that risk atti-
tudes differ depending on the measure of risk attitude applied. We also ﬁnd that subjects show low or
no risk aversion, but put very high value on the opportunity to sell the lottery in the second stage of
the decision problem. These ﬁndings cast doubts on the suitability of the random price mechanism
for truthful revelation of willingness to pay in sequential decision problems.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) provided an axiomatic treat-
ment of the expected utility hypothesis there have been discussions about the
interpretation of the theory. Was it meant to be a descriptive tool for the
analysis of actual behaviour? Or should it be viewed as a blueprint for how
to make ‘rational’ decisions in the face of risk? Shortly after this seminal 
work  experimental and empirical studies began. Camerer (1995) offers a
survey over this large literature. In economic applications, expected utility
theory became the dominant model of decision-making under risk because
it offered a clear distinction between the evaluation of outcomes (the von
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probability distribution over outcomes).
With this clear distinction between risk and risk preferences, risk attitudes
could be conveniently deﬁned in terms of curvature properties of the von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility function. Moreover, as Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1970) showed, all natural notions of behaviour towards risk lead to
the same classiﬁcation of individuals according to the curvature of their von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility function. Despite the large number of experi-
mental studies recorded by Camerer (1995), there seems to be no attempt to
test these alternative deﬁnitions of risk attitudes directly in experiments. This
is even more surprising since some of the more recent non-expected utility
theories, like the rank-dependent expected utility model of Quiggin (1982) or
the cumulative prospect theory of Tverski and Kahneman (1992), yield 
alternative conclusions about the consistency of the various concepts of risk
attitude.
1
In this paper we report about an experiment which tests different notions
of risk attitude directly. The random price mechanism (Becker et al. (1964))
was chosen in order to provide monetary incentives for revealing the valua-
tion of lotteries. This experimental design is commonly used to provide incen-
tives for the truthful revelation of valuations. Our experiment highlights some
features of the mechanism, however, which, at least to our knowledge, are
not widely known.
Our experiment studies decision-makers’ evaluations of lotteries with one
or two chance moves. In a third (dynamic) treatment participants have the
option to trade the second-stage lottery after the ﬁrst-stage lottery has been
resolved. With this design, we hope to gain insights about
•w hether subjects understand the diversiﬁcation effect of a repeated lottery,
•h ow they react to information revealed conditional on whether they are
allowed to act on this information or not, and
•h ow they value the option to sell the second stage of a lottery in the light
of the ﬁrst-stage results.
In the light of the literature on preferences for the early or late resolution
of uncertainty, the diversiﬁcation effect of a repeated task could also be
viewed as a preference for gradual resolution of uncertainty. This interpre-
tation appears rather tenuous, however, since both chance moves are per-
formed in quick succession.
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1 Chateauneuf and Cohen (2000) provide a survey of these results.The question of how decision-makers view and evaluate successive choices
is also relevant for the design of experiments itself. When accounting for
experimental results (see Camerer (1995) for a survey), one almost always
applies the model of risky decision-making to the basic decision task and not
to the repeated situation, although repeating the same risky choices may
weaken the effects of different risk attitudes. In our study the crucial stochas-
tic event occurs either once or twice and it is explicitly taken into account how
optimal behaviour depends on risk attitude. By repeating the task once
without prior announcement we test whether the smaller variance of the ﬁnal
payoffs in the repeated lottery inﬂuences actual behaviour as predicted by
theory.
In a brief summary, our experimental design can be described as 
follows. In a ﬁrst treatment, treatment A, participants are endowed with 
a lottery L which pays with equal probability a high premium 2· and a 
low premium 2· where  >> 0. Subjects have to choose the limit 
price b1 above which they are willing to sell the lottery. A price p is ran-
domly drawn. If this price p for L exceeds b1, the participant is paid the 
price p in exchange for the lottery L. Otherwise, the lottery is played and 
the participant receives its prize. Clearly, the only dominant strategy is 
to bid the price at which one is indifferent between selling and not selling 
the lottery (see Becker et al. (1964)). In essence, we apply the incentive-
compatible random price mechanism to elicit the willingness to accept for
the basic lottery L. The limit price b1 is the only decision of a 
participant.
In treatment B, the only decision is again the limit price b2 for which one
is willing to sell the repeated lottery. Here the lottery yields the sum of the
returns from two successive and independent draws of the prizes  and  .
The return from the repeated lottery is now 2· and 2· , each with proba-
bility , and  + with probability  .
Treatment C has also two chance moves but a participant is free to sell the
lottery in the ﬁrst and the second stage. More speciﬁcally, participants ﬁrst
choose a limit price b3 for which they would be willing to sell the repeated
lottery. If the random price is such that no sale occurs, then the ﬁrst lottery
drawing is carried out. Knowing the payoff from this ﬁrst stage, or  , par-
ticipants choose a second limit price b3(·) for which they would be willing to
sell the ﬁnal stage of the lottery.
Thus, the basic decision in treatment A elicits the certainty equivalent for
the basic lottery and hence the risk premium of the risky investment. Treat-
ment B determines the certainty equivalent for the once repeated lottery.
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tional sales option.
2
The experiment used both a between-subjects design where each group of
participants encounters only a single treatment and a within-subjects design
where participants confront the choice situations of all three treatments.
In the following section, we recall the most common preference-based con-
cepts of risk attitudes. Section 3 derives the optimal decisions under the
expected utility hypothesis for all three treatments. Section 4 contains the
details of our experimental procedure. The main results are described and
discussed in section 5. We conclude by summarizing our results and com-
paring them to some previous experimental studies.
2. ATTITUDES TOWARDS RISK
The literature offers several concepts for how to measure decision-makers’
attitudes towards risk. For a brief survey, Chateauneuf and Cohen (2000)
can be consulted. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) show that the following two
notions of risk aversion are equivalent in the context of an expected utility
maximizing individual.
Consider a preference relation   – on the set of lotteries L with a typical
element X = (x1, p1;...,xn, pn) where xs denotes the outcome s which occurs
with probability ps. Denote by EX the expected value of a lottery X.P r oba-
bly the best known deﬁnition compares the lottery with its certainty equiva-
lent. Following Chateauneuf and Cohen (2000), we refer to this risk attitude
notion as weakly risk averse, weakly risk neutral and weakly risk loving.
Deﬁnition 1: A decision-maker is
•w eakly risk averse if (EX, 1)   X
•w eakly risk neutral if (EX, 1) ~ X
•w eakly risk loving if (EX, 1)   X
for all X Œ L.
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2 One may argue that ‘willingness to accept’studies underestimate risk aversion due to the robust
ﬁndings of endowment or status quo effects revealing on average lower willingness to pay than
willingness to accept. Here this is not important since we are more interested in the differences
between treatments rather in the absolute evaluations of lotteries.A much stronger criterion to distinguish attitudes towards risk uses lot-
teries with the same mean value which can be ordered according to their
spread. Denote by FX(t) :=S xi£tpi the probability distribution function of










-•FY(t) dt for all x.
Denote by MPS(X) a lottery which is a mean-preserving spread of lottery 
X.
Deﬁnition 2: A decision-maker is
• strongly risk averse if X   MPS(X)
• strongly risk neutral if X ~ MPS(X)
• strongly risk loving if X   MPS(X)
for all X Œ L.
Because any lottery X is a mean-preserving spread of the lottery (EX, 1),
it is clear that every strongly risk-averse individual is also weakly risk averse.
However, the reverse implication is not true in general. For individuals with
expected utility preferences, however, the concepts of deﬁnitions 1 and 2 are
equivalent and are characterized by curvature properties of the von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility function. Chateauneuf and Cohen (1994)
also investigate the implications of concepts for measuring risk attitudes in
the context of non-expected utility theories.
3. OPTIMAL DECISIONS
The experiment elicits the value of the lottery by using the random price 
mechanism (Becker et al. (1964)) for which it is a dominant strategy to reveal
the certainty equivalent of a lottery. In each treatment, subjects were
endowed with a lottery and asked to name a price above which they would
sell the lottery. A randomly selected price then determined whether a subject
could sell the lottery.
Three treatments are considered. Treatment A assesses the subject’s atti-
tude towards risk. Treatment B is similar to treatment A but allows us to
check whether participants understand the diversiﬁcation effect of a repeated
lottery and whether they are inﬂuenced by decision-irrelevant information.
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partial resolution of uncertainty.
The basic payoff of a lottery is
• = 5 with probability 0.5,
• = 1 with probability 0.5.
This lottery is repeated once in treatments B and C. Outcomes are 
doubled in treatment A where the basic lottery is played only once. Treat-
ment C allows players to trade the second-stage lottery after the outcome of
stage 1 has been observed. Table 1 summarizes the structure of the three
treatments.
In order to contrast the experimental results with theoretical predictions,
we  determine the behaviour of an expected utility maximizer in the 
three treatments. The formal derivation of optimal bids is relegated to 
appendix A.
3.1 Treatment A
In treatment A, subjects are endowed with the following lottery:
The mean and standard deviation of lottery X1 are
Subjects are asked to quote a price b1 Œ [1, 10] for which they are willing
to sell lottery X1.A   price p Œ [1, 10] is then randomly drawn from a uniform
distribution. For p > b1, the lottery X1 is sold and the payoff of the subject
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Table 1. The structure of the three treatments
Chance moves take place
Once Twice
Decisions Once Treatment A Treatment B
take place Twice —T reatment Cis p.F or p £ b1, the lottery X1 is played and the subject receives the lottery
payout. Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of moves.
The expected utility from quoting a sales price b is easily computed as
It is optimal for the decision-maker to offer the certainty equivalent of the
lottery as limit price for which the lottery will be sold:
It is worth noting that the expected utility of the lottery plus sales option
exceeds the expected value of the basic lottery. For u(x) = x (risk neutrality)
we obtain b* 1 = 6 and V1(b* 1) = which is higher than the lottery’s expected
value of 6 due to the additional expected gains from random prices larger
than 6. It is, of course, questionable whether, in view of the minor stakes in
usual classroom experiments, deviations from risk neutrality make sense. As
shown by Rabin (2000) substantial deviations from risk neutrality in such
experiments would imply absurd degrees of risk aversion or risk loving over
large stakes.
3.2 Treatment B
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2 · p = 10 –
2 · p = 2
–
Figure 1. Treatment A.As mean and standard deviation of the compound lottery X2 we obtain
Note that lottery X1 is a mean-preserving spread of lottery X2.
As in treatment A, subjects are asked to quote a price b2 Œ [1, 10] for which
they would be willing to sell the lottery X2. The price p Œ [1, 10] is randomly
drawn from a uniform distribution. For p > b2, the lottery X2 is sold and the
payoff of the subject is p.F or p £ b2, the lottery X2 is played and the subject
receives the lottery payout. Figure 2 illustrates this scenario.
Maintaining the assumption that decision-makers are expected utility
maximizers, the expected utility from a bid b is easily computed:
and the optimal bid b* 2 is
which is again equal to the certainty equivalent of lottery X2.
Comparing the optimal bids in treatments A and B, it is not difﬁcult to
check the following properties.
•F or risk-averse decision-makers, u(·) strictly concave,
follows, since X1 is a mean-preserving spread of X2.
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Figure 2. Treatment B.• In the case of risk-neutral decision-makers, u(x) = x,w e obtain
•F or risk-loving agents, u(·) strictly convex, we have
3.3 Treatment C
In treatment C, subjects face a repeated lottery with the same payoffs as in
X2. In addition, the participants have an opportunity to sell the lottery after
the ﬁrst stage. The endowment of participants is the lottery
with mean m3 = m2 = m1 and standard deviation s3s2 = s1/√ 2
–
In stage 1, the subjects quote a price b3 Œ [1, 10] for which they are willing
to sell the lottery. A price p Œ [1, 10] is then randomly drawn from a uniform
distribution. For p > b3, the lottery X3 is sold and the payoff of the subject
is p.F or p £ b3, the ﬁrst stage of the lottery X3 is played.
After observing the outcome of the ﬁrst stage, = 1 or  = 5, respectively,
owners of the lottery who have not sold the lottery in stage 1 can make a
second sales offer at prices b3 := b3()   or  3 := b3() ,r espectively. Again a
price p¢Œ[1, 10] is drawn from a uniform distribution. For p¢≥b3 (p¢≥ 3),
the lottery is sold and the payoff of the subject is p¢.F or p¢<b3 (p¢< 3), the
second draw of the lottery X3 takes place and the respective payoffs are real-
ized. Figure 3 illustrates this choice situation.
One can determine the optimal limit prices working backwards. Suppose
the lottery was not sold in stage 1. In stage 2, the expected utility from
quoting a price b3(x), which may depend on the previously realized result x,
i.e. or , is
Choosing b(x) optimally we obtain the limit price b* 3(x)
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For a risk-neutral participant with u(x)  = x, V* 3(x)  = x + and the




Vx V bx x
ux ux
bx

















bx u u x u x x 3
1 1
2





98 Jürgen Eichberger et al.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003










b Œ [1, 10] p¢ Œ [1, 10]






2 · p = 10 –
p + p = 6 –
–
1
b Œ [1, 10] p≤ Œ [1, 10]













p + p = 6 –
–
2
Figure 3. Treatment C.stage lottery yields an additional value of which is much higher than the
expected value of 3 from the second-stage lottery alone.
In stage 1, an expected utility maximizer will choose the limit price such
that
is maximized,
It is possible not to sell the second-stage lottery by bidding sufﬁciently
high. Hence, the two-stage lottery X2 is a choice option of the decision-maker.
Consequently, b* 3 ≥ b* 2 must be true. For a risk-neutral decision-maker with
u(x) = x,f or example, the optimal bid b* 3 = exceeds b* 2 = 6 and also lottery
X3’s certainty equivalent of 6. In fact, one can show that b* 3 > b* 2. This extra
value of lottery X3 is a consequence of the additional sales option in stage
2. The following proposition summarizes the comparison of bids. The proof
is straightforward and omitted.
Proposition 1: Suppose decision-makers’ preferences satisfy the expected
utility hypothesis.
1. If decision-makers are
• risk averse, then 6 > b* 2 > b* 1,
• risk neutral, then 6 = b* 2 = b* 1,
• risk loving, then 6 < b* 2 < b* 1.
2. For any attitude towards risk,
The higher bids in treatment C reﬂect the chances of extra proﬁts from the
sales mechanism with randomly chosen prices. Decision-makers of any risk
attitude will like these extra chances.
3.4 Hypotheses
Based on the assumption that decision-makers are expected utility 
maximizers with uniform curvature of the von Neumann–Morgenstern
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hypotheses.
1. Expected utility:
• either 6 > b* 2 > b* 1 (risk aversion),
• or 6 = b* 2 = b* 1 (risk neutrality),
• or 6 < b* 2 < b* 1 (risk preference).
2. Risk attitudes: risk attitudes do not depend on whether they are measured
by
• the difference between certainty equivalent and expected value,
b* 1 - 6 ≥
< 0, or
•p r eferences over mean-preserving spreads, b* 1 - b* 2 ≥
< 0.
3. Value of the random price mechanism: individuals do realize that the
random price mechanism has an intrinsic value.
Our experimental design should allow us to check these hypotheses. In con-
trast to non-expected utility theories, expected utility implies that risk-averse
individuals have a certainty equivalent below the expected value of the lottery
and a preference for less dispersed distributions in the sense of mean-
preserving spreads. It will be interesting to see whether participants of the
experiment will value the extra chances inherent in the random price 
mechanism as highly as the theory predicts.
4. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The experimental sessions were carried out at the Humboldt University in
Berlin. Participants were students of economics from a large ﬁrst-year micro-
economics course.
3 For each session, a group of 40 students was recruited.
In addition to performing the experimental task, participants were asked to
ﬁll in a questionnaire assessing their understanding of the experimental pro-
cedure. An English translation of the German instructions is given in 
appendix B. In order to control for effects due to the novelty of the situa-
tion, each treatment was repeated a second time without prior announce-
ment. By this we have tried to exclude the further diversiﬁcation effect of
repeating an experimental decision task involving uncertainty.
Three groups of students participated only in a single treatment. We refer
to these groups as between-subjects experiments. A fourth group of students
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3 At this time, the course had not yet introduced concepts of decision-making under risk.made decisions on all three treatments. We refer to this group as within-
subjects experiments. The between-subjects design confronts different people
with different decision tasks. When comparing the different tasks one relies
on the homogeneity of these groups. One can control for group homogene-
ity by asking participants to answer a questionnaire on their characteristics.
The within-subjects design avoids such homogeneity problems but may over-
burden participants and induce less situation-speciﬁc behaviour. The within-
subjects group offers the opportunity to study consistency of risk attitudes
and behaviour across treatments.
A group of 40 students was confronted with the one-stage lottery (treat-
ment A). A second group of 39 students attended the experiment of treat-
ment B. A third group of 38 students was subjected to treatment C.
The group of 40 participants in the within-subjects experiment was split
into two subgroups of 20 participants. For the ﬁrst group of 20, earnings of
all three treatments were actually paid. For the second group, the threefold
earnings of one randomly selected treatment was paid out. This distinction
was made in order to check whether the widespread practice of paying out
only one randomly selected outcome would affect the participants’behaviour
(see Cubitt et al. (1998b)).
5. RESULTS
Two types of results will be distinguished in this section. First, we will deal
with the question of whether the observed behaviour is consistent with 
theoretical predictions based on expected utility theory. These theoretical
predictions were derived and formulated in three hypotheses in section 2. In
a separate subsection, we will reconsider our results as to their implications
for the design of decision-making experiments. The complete data set is given
in appendix C.
5.1 Risk attitudes and valuation of the resale option
5.1.1 Risk attitudes
Risk attitudes of expected utility maximizers can be tested either
•b y comparing the certainty equivalent of a lottery with its expected value
or
•b y studying their preference over mean-preserving spreads.
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preserving spread of lottery X(m). If a decision-maker’s preferences satisfy
the expected utility hypothesis,
4 then the preference pattern given in table 2
must hold.
Moreover, m > b(X(m)) > b(X¢(m)) for risk-averse participants, while the
reverse inequalities must hold for risk-loving decision-makers.
Examining the average bids for the one-stage lottery in treatment A, we
ﬁnd values of 6.17 and 6.38 in the ﬁrst round (table 3) and 6.32 and 6.34 in
the second round (table 4). At ﬁrst sight, this suggests that the participants
were risk neutral with a slight tendency towards risk-loving behaviour.
5 This
overall risk neutrality is conﬁrmed by the results for the mode and median
in this treatment. The average bids for the lotteries with a reduced variance
in treatment B, their modes and medians also support this picture. Risk neu-
trality would predict a bid of exactly 6 in both treatments A and B. The null
hypothesis of equal bid distributions for treatments A and B in ﬁrst-round
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4 Note that these two indicators for risk attitude no longer lead to the same classiﬁcation if the
decision-maker’s preferences do not satisfy the expected utility hypothesis.
5 Since we elicit the willingness to accept rather than the one to pay, the fact that average bids
are sightly larger than the monetary expectation of the lottery could be caused by an endow-
ment or status quo effect (see Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988)).
Table 2. Preference pattern
Risk attitude Certainty equivalent Mean-preserving spread
Risk averse m > b(X(m)) and b(X(m)) > b(X¢(m))
Risk neutral m = b(X(m)) and b(X(m)) = b(X¢(m))
Risk loving m < b(X(m)) and b(X(m)) < b(X¢(m))
Table 3. First-round results for initial bids
Method Treatment Mean Median Mode Standard Min Max N
deviation
Between A 6.17 6.0 6.0 1.61 1.0 10.0 40
subjects B 6.10 6.0 6.0 1.24 2.9 10.0 39
C 7.31 7.5 6.0 1.35 5.0 9.9 38
Within A 6.38 6.0 6.0 1.51 2.5 10.0 40
subjects B 6.60 6.3 6.0 1.67 1.0 10.0 40
C 7.74 8.0 6.0 1.60 4.7 10.0 40bids of the between-subjects design cannot be rejected in a two-tailed
Mann–Whitney U test (p = 0.917).
This picture of a risk-neutral population of participants is put into ques-
tion by the comparison of the mean bids in treatments A and B. Except for
the ﬁrst round of the within-subjects case, average bids are slightly higher for
the more dispersed lottery in treatment A. This indicates risk-loving behav-
iour. Though the exceptional within-subjects case may be viewed as suggest-
ing a risk-averse preference for a smaller variance, a one-tailed Wilcoxon test
of the null hypothesis that the bid distribution in treatment A is concentrated
on lower bids than in treatment B in the ﬁrst round can be rejected at the
10% level (p = 0.074). The comparison of treatments A and B supports the
view of a slightly risk-loving population of participants.
The conﬂicting assessment of the participants’ risk attitudes, depending 
on whether the risk attitude is measured by divergence of the certainty-
equivalent bid from the expected value of the lottery or by the preferences
over mean-preserving spreads, suggests a closer look at the risk attitudes dis-
played in the choices of treatments A and B.
5.1.2 Consistency of risk attitudes
As argued in section 2, whether measured by the preference for the expected
value of a lottery or by the disliking of mean-preserving spreads, individu-
als with expected utility preferences should be classiﬁed according to their
risk attitudes consistently. For individuals with non-expected utility prefer-
ences such consistency is not necessary. Since any lottery can be viewed as a
mean-preserving spread of its mean, the strong measure of risk attitude of
deﬁnition 2 will imply the weak notion of deﬁnition 1. Since risk attitudes
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Table 4. Second-round results for initial bids
Method Treatment Mean Median Mode Standard Min Max N
deviation
Between A 6.32 6.0 6.0 1.87 2.7 10.0 40
subjects B 6.00 6.0 6.0 1.56 1.0 10.0 39
C 7.44 7.7 8.0 1.58 3.5 10.0 38
Within A 6.34 6.0 6.0 1.58 3.0 10.0 40
subjects B 6.28 6.0 6.0 1.40 1.0 10.0 40
C 7.37 7.25 6.0 1.60 4.0 10.0 40are a characteristic of an individual, comparing the bids in treatments A 
and B of our within-subjects experiments should shed some light on this
question.
We  classify the risk attitude of participants in the within-subjects 
design according to the certainty-equivalent bid and according to their pref-
erences over mean-preserving spreads. When investigating how many partici-
pants were consistent in their risk attitudes, we do not want to rely on small
numerical variations in the bids but on rather broad classiﬁcations. We will
classify a decision-maker as risk neutral if the bid in treatment A, b(A), falls
into an interval [m - 0.5, m + 0.5]. Similarly, a subject submitting a bid in
treatment B, b(B), in the interval of 0.5 around b(A), [b(A) - 0.5, b(A) + 0.5],
will be classiﬁed as risk neutral. The deviation of ±0.5 corresponds to ap-
proximately 6% of the total variation of payoffs. Table 5 summarizes this 
classiﬁcation.
A cross-tabulation according to this classiﬁcation for both groups of par-
ticipants in the within-subjects treatments is given in tables 6 and 7. Table 6
tests the consistency of the measurement of risk attitudes in the ﬁrst round
of the within-subjects case.
Most striking is the fact that only a quarter of the participants (11 sub-
jects) were ranked consistently by the two measures. This observation cer-
tainly casts doubt on the validity of the assumption that these individuals
are expected utility maximizers. Since risk neutrality is a borderline case, we
had to construct intervals around the critical values. As a consequence there
is necessarily some imprecision of measurement in the neighbourhood of risk
neutrality.
Disregarding the middle row and column, there remains a surprisingly
large number of subjects (nine participants) who had a certainty-equivalent
bid below the expected value of the lottery but did strictly prefer the riskier
lottery in treatment A. According to our classiﬁcation in section 2 these indi-
viduals are weakly risk averse but not strongly risk averse. Such behaviour is
perfectly acceptable for non-expected utility maximizers.
6
104 Jürgen Eichberger et al.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003
6 For example, with the rank-dependent expected utility model one can explain such behaviour
easily if the von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function is concave and the probability transfor-
mation function is convex. We would like to thank Michelle Cohen for pointing this out to us.
Table 5. Classiﬁcation of attitudes towards risk
Risk averse Risk neutral Risk loving
b(A) < 5.5 5.5 £ b(A) £ 6.5 6.5 < b(A)
b(A) + 0.5 < b(B) b(A) - 0.5 £ b(B) £ b(A) + 0.5 b(B) < b(A) - 0.5The four subjects who were ranked as risk loving according to the certainty
equivalent and risk averse because of their dislike of mean-preserving spreads
are not consistent with the concepts of weak and strong attitudes towards
risk. They dislike mean-preserving spreads sometimes but not always.
Table 6 conﬁrms the previous observation that subjects tended to be risk
neutral or risk loving. In general, the preference for the more risky lottery
was stronger than the ranking according to the certainty-equivalent bid
would suggest.
Table 7 cross-tabulates the classiﬁcation of risk preferences according to
preference for diversiﬁcation and according to the certainty equivalent for
the second round of the within-subjects treatment.
The second round shows a more consistent picture. Over 50% of the 
group (21 subjects) are now ranked the same way by the two measures. More-
over, the extremely inconsistent behaviour of risk-averse subjects according
to the certainty-equivalent bid preferring the riskier lottery has nearly dis-
appeared. This could be interpreted as if subjects would need some experi-
ence with the treatment before understanding completely the implications of
the scenario.
The effect of experience is also reﬂected in signiﬁcantly lower bids in the
repetition of treatments B and C for the pooled data of the within-subjects
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Table 6. Cross-tabulation of risk attitude classiﬁcations: ﬁrst round
Preferences for diversiﬁcation
Risk averse Risk neutral Risk loving N
Certainty- Risk averse 039 1 2
equivalent Risk neutral 11 0 2 1 3
based Risk loving 41 0 1 1 5
N 52 31 2 4 0
Table 7. Cross-tabulation of risk attitude classiﬁcations: second round
Preferences for diversiﬁcation
Risk averse Risk neutral Risk loving N
Certainty- Risk averse 55 1 1 1
equivalent Risk neutral 21 21 1 5
based Risk loving 01 04 1 4
N 72 76 4 0design (p = 0.049 for treatment B and p = 0.0295 for ﬁrst-stage bids in treat-
ment C in a one-tailed Wilcoxon test).
Consistency of the two measures for attitudes toward risk requires 
some understanding of the concept of a mean-preserving spread. Consis-
tency over the two rounds in terms of certainty-equivalent bids does not rely
on such skills. This consistency can also be tested for the between-subjects
treatments.
Consider ﬁrst the between-subjects results of treatment A (see table 8). In
this case, 60% of the participants (24 subjects) are consistent in their atti-
tudes towards risk. The dominant risk attitude appears to be risk-loving
behaviour. In treatment B, the degree of consistency is even greater. In con-
trast to treatment A, however, 50% of the participants can be ranked as risk
neutral (see table 9).
5.1.3 Preference for resale option
In treatment C, decision-makers could sell the second stage of their lottery
if they had not sold the whole lottery in stage 1. Though this lottery resem-
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Table 8. Cross-tabulation of risk attitude in treatment A:
ﬁrst versus second round
Second round
Risk averse Risk neutral Risk loving N
First round Risk averse 533 1 1
Risk neutral 582 1 5
Risk loving 12 1 1 14
N 11 13 16 40
Table 9. Cross-tabulation of risk attitude in treatment B: ﬁrst versus 
second round
Second round
Risk averse Risk neutral Risk loving N
First round Risk averse 60 1 7
Risk neutral 21 9 3 2 4
Risk loving 02 6 8
N 82 1 1 0 3 9bles the one in treatment B, the experimental results show a completely dif-
ferent picture. Due to the second sale option after stage 1, decision-makers
could proﬁt twice from randomly chosen prices. Our theoretical considera-
tions in section 2 suggest that decision-makers will value highly the extra
option to sell in the random price mechanism. The analysis of optimal behav-
iour in section 3 suggests that, for all types of risk preferences, the ﬁrst bid
in treatment C should exceed the bid in treatment B. In the case of risk neu-
trality, the ﬁrst bid should be as high as 8.7.
Indeed, the experimental results show high ﬁrst-stage bids in treatment C.
While the average bid was close to 6 in treatments A and B, it was between
7.31 and 7.74 in treatment C (table 3). The median was similarly upward
biased, while the mode remained at the expected value m = 6. This suggests
a strong positive valuation for the additional sales option.
These observations are conﬁrmed by statistical tests of the null hypo-
thesis of higher bids in treatment C. In the ﬁrst round of treatment C, the
distribution of ﬁrst-stage bids is signiﬁcantly more concentrated on higher
bids than in the ﬁrst rounds of treatments A and B. Using a one-tailed
Mann–Whitney U test for the between-subjects data yields p = 0.0005 for
treatment C versus treatment A and p < 0.001 for treatment C versus treat-
ment B. For the within-subjects data, a one-tailed Wilcoxon test resulted also
in p < 0.001 both for treatment C versus treatment A and for treatment C
versus Treatment B.
Though, in the ﬁrst round of treatment C, bids clearly exceeded the bids
in the other treatments, they did not reach the level 8.72 predicted for a risk-
neutral expected utility maximizer in section 3. This more cautious behav-
iour stands in stark contrast to the risk-loving tendencies in treatments A
and B. Obviously, subjects realized the potential to gain from the random
price mechanism as our hypothesis in section 4 predicted; however, the exu-
berance in the face of risk seems to be greatly diminished. It is possible that
the participants took this part of the experiment as a more serious task than
the pure choices of lotteries.
Probably the most surprising feature of the results, however, is the bids in
the second stage of treatment C. Table 10 shows mean bids ranging from 4.14
to 5.97. In the second-stage lottery the expected value equals 3 and the
maximum payout from the lottery was 5. The summary statistics in table 10
suggest an extreme risk-liking behaviour. The frequency distributions show
bids up to 10, double the maximum outcome of the lottery. Such behaviour
is inconsistent with expected utility theory, in fact with any decision theory
which is purely consequentialist. In order to explain bids which exceed the
maximum payoff of a lottery, a decision-maker has to have an intrinsic pref-
erence for gambling.
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highest bids in period 1. Thus, there is a selection bias towards more risk-
loving participants. Hence, it should not be surprising to ﬁnd more risk-
loving behaviour in the group of second-stage bidders. Yet, bidding more
than the maximum amount that could be obtained in the second-stage lottery
cannot be reconciled with standard decision theories which insist on valuing
only the outcomes of the lottery.
7
In assessing this extreme overbidding in the second round as inconsistent
with any purely consequentialist decision theory, we implicitly assume that
participants were not inﬂuenced by the random price mechanism itself. In
theory the maximum price of the range of random prices should not matter
for the incentive to bid the true valuation of the lottery. Hence there was no
reason to adjust the price range of the random price mechanism for the
second-stage bid where the maximum gain from the lottery was 5. The highest
possible random price of 10 was chosen to match the highest price of the
compound lottery and maintained for the second-stage bid. In a different
context, Bohm et al. (1997) report bidding behaviour in the random price
mechanism which is sensitive to the range of random prices.
In the light of the observations by Bohm et al. (1997), one cannot exclude
the possibility that many participants of our experiment were induced by the
high price of 10 in the random price mechanism to bid more than 5 when
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Table 10. Second-stage bids in treatment C
Round Method Type Mean Median Mode Standard Min Max N
of bid deviation
First Between 3 4.14 4.7 5.0 1.33 1.0 6.0 14
subjects b3 4.74 4.9 3.0 1.52 2.5 7.5 15
Within 3 5.56 5.0 4.0 2.05 3.0 10.0 16
subjects b3 4.75 5.0 5.0 1.65 1.0 8.2 24
Second Between 3 3.94 4.0 3.0 1.54 1.1 6.6 16
subjects b3 3.86 4.0 5.0 1.21 2.4 5.0 8
Within 3 4.89 5.0 5.0 1.83 1.0 7.49 14





7 This argument would, of course, also question the interpretation of average bids b1 and b2
exceeding m = 6 as risk-loving behaviour. The columns ‘Max’ in tables 3 and 4 show that some
participants always preferred to keep the lottery, which would imply extremely risk-loving 
attitudes.selling the second-stage lottery with the maximum prize of 5. The highest
price of the random price mechanism may have become the focal point for
determining the bid. Thus, some participants may have confused the value
of the random price mechanism with the value of the lottery, not under-
standing the role of the bid as a way to insure against random prices below
their valuation of the lottery. These observations suggest that the random
price mechanism should be subjected to a severe experimental test of its
robustness with regard to the range of random prices.
Finally, the results of table 10 reveal no clear wealth effect. A one-sided
Wilcoxon test of the null hypothesis of a higher bid distribution after a low
payoff is not supported by the data. There is also no hint of the ‘gambler’s
effect’ of an increased expectation of a high outcome as a consequence of a
low outcome in stage 1.
5.1.4 Competence of participants
The discrepancies in the risk preferences of participants when measured by
certainty equivalents or preferences over mean-preserving spreads suggest
that the answers to the questionnaires should be checked to see whether par-
ticipants did understand the implications of the different lotteries. The ques-
tionnaire posed four questions related to the outcome of the lottery and the
payoff obtainable from a bid for two results of the draws in the lottery and
from the price distribution. Competence of the participant was measured by
the sum of the scores of the four questions, where a correct answer was given
a mark of 1, a false answer a mark of -1, and no answer was given 0.
Table 11 shows the relationship between competence levels ranging from
4, all answers were correct, to -4, no answer was correct, and the share of
subjects within the same competence group who were consistent in their risk
attitudes across rounds. The table shows only a slight positive relationship
p
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Table 11. Competence of participants as measured by the answers to control
questions
Competence level
4 321 0 -1 -2 -3 -4
Treatment A 1 — 0.7 0 0.43 1 0.4 — 0
Treatment B 0.84 — 0.8 0.75 1 1 0.8 0.5 0
Treatment C — 0.75 1 0.93 1 1 1 0.5 —110 Jürgen Eichberger et al.
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between the degree of understanding of the lotteries and of the sales mech-
anism and the degree of consistency in risk attitudes. We conclude from this
that incompetence about the lotteries and the sales mechanism cannot
account for the observed inconsistencies in the classiﬁcation of risk attitudes.
5.2 Methodological issues
Several implications for the design of experiments can be drawn from our
observations.
5.2.1 Between- versus within-subjects data
Do participants react signiﬁcantly to ‘method’, i.e. to being confronted with
only one task (A, B or C) or to all three tasks? When testing this hypothesis
we rely on the pooled data of the within-subjects design. At the 1% level
homogeneity of the between-subjects and the within-subjects distributions
cannot be rejected for treatments A, B and (ﬁrst-stage bids) C. At the 5%
level the (on average negative) difference of ﬁrst-round bids in treatment B
when comparing between- with within-subjects data is signiﬁcant. In our
view, such weak conﬁrmation for one of the altogether six comparisons
should not be overrated. Whatever can be learned from our data is supported
by both the between-subjects and the within-subjects data.
5.2.2 Effect of random payout
In the within-subjects experiments, half of the 40 participants (group 1) were
paid for all three tasks whereas the other half were paid only for one ran-
domly selected task A, B or C. To provide similar monetary incentives for
these groups, the randomly selected payoff was tripled.
Comparing the bid distributions of ﬁrst- and second-round bids in the case
of treatment A reveals only one weak (p = 0.049) effect in the case of
ﬁrst-stage bids in the ﬁrst round of treatment C. In our view, such a weak
effect for one of altogether eight comparisons (we have pooled the second-
period bids  3 and b3 in treatment C) does not question our former analysis
which disregarded the different payment regimes in the case of treatment C
and the within-subjects design (see Cubitt et al. (1998a), who report positive
effects of deterministic versus stochastic payment for a different but related
task).
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5.2.3 The random price mechanism for eliciting certainty equivalents
In a recent study, Bohm et al. (1997) found that the random price mecha-
nism is sensitive to the support of the price distribution. In particular, the
maximum price possible appears to be important for the results of the mecha-
nism. To avoid such effects in our experiment, the random price p¢ in stage
2 of treatment C was selected from the same interval [1, 10] as the price p in
stage 1. The extreme overbidding observed in stage 2 of treatment C may be
an unintended consequence of this design choice. Retrospectively, it appears
possible that the fact that a price of 10 was possible in stage 2 may have
biased upward the bids of the participants. Such a bias may, of course, have
inﬂuenced also bids in the other treatments.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We can summarize our main ﬁndings by the following effects.
1. Subjects show risk neutrality or risk-loving behaviour.
2. Consistency in risk attitudes across repetitions and for different measures
of risk attitudes is limited.
3. Subjects are aware of the value of the resale option due to the random
price mechanism.
4. Subjects bid unreasonably high in second sale.
A noticeable result of our experiment is the observation that, in this simple
lottery context, the behaviour of a large number of participants appears to
be consistent with expected utility theory and risk-loving or risk-neutral pref-
erences. The large group of subjects who were classiﬁed as weakly risk averse
but strongly risk loving in the within-subjects experiments suggests, however,
that at least a substantial proportion of subjects may be better characterized
by non-expected utility theories.
It is also consistent with expected utility theory that bids in stage 1 of treat-
ment C were signiﬁcantly higher than bids in treatment B. In these respects
expected utility theory appears to be sufﬁciently ﬂexible to explain these
observations. Other results of our experiment are harder to reconcile with
well-known theories of behaviour under risk. The overbidding in stage 2 of
treatment C is incompatible not only with expected utility theory but with
any purely consequentialist explanation.
There are, of course, competing explanations for some of our observations.
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(see footnote 5). Inconsistency in the risk preferences across treatments could
be due to people who are variety seeking not only in consumption but also
in risk taking. The unreasonable high bids in stage 2 of treatment C may be
a consequence of the sensitivity of the random price mechanism to the
maximum price in the random price distribution.
Despite these additional considerations, our study leaves us with two
lessons which point out new routes for further research.
1. On the one hand, our experimental results cast some doubts on the 
robustness of various theoretically well-established measures of risk 
attitudes as a stable feature of an individual’s preferences. When we
designed our experiment we did not expect that risk attitudes would be a
critical aspect in our setup. The two-stage lottery design offered the oppor-
tunity to test the two commonly used notions of risk aversion. Such a
direct test had not been performed before and we expected behaviour con-
sistent with both the expected-value-based measure and the mean-pre-
serving-spread-based measure as predicted by expected utility theory.
Though we observed more consistent behaviour in the repetition of our
experiment, there are sufﬁcient doubts to warrant further research. In 
particular, our experiment suggests use of the classiﬁcation of individu-
als’ preferences according to the two concepts of risk aversion to 
test whether individ-uals’ preferences are better represented by the
expected utility hypothesis or by non-expected utility theories. Only
expected utility requires both concepts to coincide. Rank-dependent 
theories predict only strongly risk-averse individuals to be weakly risk
averse. This distinction suggests new experiments testing risk attitudes
directly.
2. On the other hand, our experiments question the random price mecha-
nism as an appropriate tool to elicit true valuations, in particular in
sequential decisions. The mechanism assumes that individuals who face
the lottery of the random price mechanism realize that the value of the
object which they offer to sell serves as a hedge against low prices. In par-
ticular, a bid does not compromise their chances for obtaining high prices.
Hence, the upper limit of the mechanism’s price range should not matter
for their bid. Yet there is no doubt that the mechanism has a value which
is clearly recognized by the subjects in their bidding behaviour. Moreover,
as the extreme overbidding of the second-stage valuation of the lottery
indicates, people may confuse the values of the lottery and the mecha-
nism. In any case, as a widely used mechanism for the truthful elicitation
of valuations, the random price mechanism deserves further scrutiny. Onemust carefully test its suitability for the evaluation of lotteries and in
sequential decision scenarios.
APPENDIX A: OPTIMAL BIDS
Optimal behaviour in treatment A
Straightforward calculation shows that V1(b) is a concave function if the von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility index u is a strictly increasing function.
In this treatment, subjects face the decision problem
Differentiating V1(b) yields the following ﬁrst-order condition which is also
sufﬁcient because V1(b) is concave:
It is optimal for the decision-maker to offer the certainty equivalent of the
lottery as limit price for which the lottery will be sold. Solving for b* 1 yields
the optimal quote for the sales price:
Optimal behaviour in treatment B
V2(b) is concave if u is a strictly increasing function. The ﬁrst-order condi-
tions of the problem
are necessary and sufﬁcient:
1
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X2,
Optimal behaviour in treatment C
One can determine the optimal limit prices working backwards. Suppose the
lottery was not sold in stage 1. In stage 2 a limit price b* 3(x) will be deter-
mined which may depend on the previously realized result x, i.e. or . The
expected utility from quoting a price b3(x) is
The optimization problem
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that
is maximized. From the ﬁrst-order condition
we compute
APPENDIX B: INSTRUCTIONS (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
Treatment A [B]
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully! Do not
talk to your neighbours and keep quiet during the entire experiment. If you
have a question, give notice. We will then come to you.
In this experiment you will have to make a few decisions. How much money
you will ﬁnally earn depends on your own decisions as well as on chance
moves.
You have the opportunity to participate in a lottery which pays in periods
1 and 2 either DM5.00 or DM1.00. How is it decided which of the payoffs
the lottery generates in the two periods?
You will throw a die once [twice].
•Y ou win in period 1 and 2 DM5.00 if the die shows an even number.
[You win DM5.00 each time the die shows an even number.]
•Y ou win in period 1 and 2 DM1.00 if the die shows an odd number.
[You win DM1.00 each time the die shows an odd number.]
You can now keep the lottery and participate in it or you can sell it to us
(the experimenters).
How can you sell the lottery, in case you want to?
For this purpose you have to determine a lower price limit b (b has to lie
between DM1.00 and DM10.00). You will sell the lottery at a randomly
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© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003chosen price p,i fp is larger than your price limit b. Otherwise you will keep
the lottery and participate in it. The price p will be randomly selected from
the set of all prices:
(*)
Please note that your price limit b does not determine the price at which
you sell the lottery but the interval (b < p £ DM10.00) of prices p for which
you are willing to sell the lottery. Therefore, the price limit optimal for you
is the price p at  which selling and not selling the lottery appears equally
favourable.
Please note further that by choosing b = DM10.00 you can ensure keeping
the lottery independent of the randomly drawn price. In contrast to this you
can ensure to sell the lottery in any case by the choice of b = DM1.00.
For a better understanding of the rules the sequence of events is listed
again.
1. You determine your lower price limit b. (As explained above, this is the
price limit above which you are willing to sell the lottery to us.)
2. The price p is randomly selected. (For this purpose, somebody will reach
into a bowl with chips. The chips carry the prices listed in (*).
3. If p > b,y ou will sell the lottery to us. In this case your payoff will be 
DM p.
4. If p £ b,y ou will keep the lottery and participate in it. It will be played
by you by throwing the die once [twice]. In this case you will receive the
payoff of the lottery as described above.
The decision is made on a separate form, which we will soon hand out to
all participants.
You will receive a code-number to keep your anonymity towards us. Please
keep your code-card carefully, because you will later receive your payment
only when presenting it.
Treatment C
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully! Do not
talk to your neighbours and keep quiet during the entire experiment. If you
have a question, give notice. We will then come to you.
In this experiment you will have to make a few decisions. How much money
you will ﬁnally earn depends on your own decisions as well as on chance moves.
DM DM DM DM 11 0 12 0 99 01 0 0 0 ., .,..., . , .
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1 and 2 either DM5.00 or DM1.00. How is it decided which of the payoffs
the lottery generates in the two periods?
You will throw a die twice.
•Y ou win DM5.00 each time the die shows an even number.
•Y ou win DM1.00 each time the die shows an odd number.
You can now keep the lottery and participate in it or you can sell it to us
(the experimenters).
How can you sell the lottery, in case you want to?
In the ﬁrst place you can sell the lottery as a whole. To do this you have
to determine a lower price limit b (b has to lie between DM1.00 and
DM10.00). You will sell the entire lottery at a randomly chosen price p,i fp
is larger than your price limit b. Otherwise you will keep the lottery and par-
ticipate in it by throwing the die once. The price p will be randomly selected
from the set of all prices:
(*)
If you have not sold the entire lottery, you can again sell your payoff claims
from the second throw of the die. This follows according to the same proce-
dure as above.
Please note that your price limit b does not determine the price at 
which you sell the entire lottery (respectively your payoff claims from the
second throw of the die), but the interval (b < p £ DM10.00) of prices p,f o r
which you are willing to sell the entire lottery (respectively your payoff claims
from the second throw of the die). Therefore, the price limit optimal for you
is the price p at  which selling and not selling the lottery appears equally
favourable.
Please note further that by choosing b = DM10.00 you can ensure keeping
your payoff claims from each throw of the die independent of the randomly
drawn price. In contrast to this you can ensure to sell the entire lottery
(respectively your payoff claims from the second throw of the die) in any case
by the choice of b = DM1.00.
For a better understanding of the rules the sequence of events is listed
again.
1. You determine your lower price limit b for the entire lottery. (As explained
above, this is the price limit above which you are willing to sell the entire
lottery to us.)
DM DM DM DM 11 0 12 0 99 0 1 00 0 ., .,..., . , .
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into a bowl with chips. The chips carry the prices listed in (*).)
3. If p > b,y ou will sell the entire lottery to us. In this case your payoff will
be DM p and the experiment ends.
4. If p £ b,y ou will keep the lottery and participate in it and the experiment
will be continued. The ﬁrst period of the lottery will be played by you by
throwing the die once. The respective payoff is your proﬁt of the ﬁrst
period.
5. You can now sell your payoff claims from the second throw of the die by
again determining a lower price limit b.
6. A second price p is randomly determined.
7. If p > b you will sell your payoff claims from the second throw of the die.
In this case your payment is DM p plus your proﬁts from the ﬁrst period.
8. If p £ b you will keep your payoff claims from the second throw of the
die. The second period of the lottery is then played by you throwing 
the die again. Your payment is then the sum of the respective proﬁts from
the ﬁrst and the second throw of the die.
The decision(s) are made on a separate form, which we will soon hand out
to all participants. You will receive a code-number to keep your anonymity
towards us. Please keep your code-card carefully, because you will later
receive your payment only when presenting it.
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1. Between-subjects treatments
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Treatment A Treactment B
First-round Second-round First-round Second-round
Subject bid bid Subject bid bid
a-1 5.00 6.00 b-1 10.00 10.00
a-2 8.00 6.00 b-2 5.00 5.00
a-3 7.90 7.50 b-4 6.00 6.00
a-4 5.50 5.50 b-5 6.50 7.00
a-5 6.00 6.00 b-6 6.00 6.00
a-6 5.40 6.80 b-7 6.00 6.00
a-7 7.99 7.99 b-8 6.00 6.00
a-8 4.90 10.00 b-9 6.00 5.00
a-9 5.00 5.00 b-10 4.00 4.50
a-10 4.00 3.00 b-11 4.90 1.00
a-11 1.00 10.00 b-12 8.00 6.00
a-12 7.50 7.50 b-13 6.00 6.00
a-13 8.00 8.00 b-14 6.10 6.10
a-14 6.00 6.00 b-15 8.00 6.00
a-15 7.00 5.00 b-16 5.99 5.99
a-16 5.50 4.50 b-17 6.00 6.00
a-17 8.00 8.00 b-18 2.90 3.00
a-18 6.90 6.90 b-19 6.00 6.00
a-19 6.00 5.00 b-20 6.00 6.00
a-20 4.50 3.20 b-21 6.00 6.00
a-21 7.00 5.60 b-22 5.90 5.90
a-22 5.50 5.00 b-23 6.00 6.00
a-23 6.00 6.00 b-24 7.00 7.00
a-24 6.50 7.50 b-25 6.10 3.90
a-25 3.50 6.30 b-26 4.00 4.00
a-26 5.50 5.50 b-27 6.00 6.00
a-27 6.00 2.70 b-28 6.00 10.00
a-28 6.00 9.50 b-29 8.00 8.00
a-29 9.00 8.00 b-30 6.70 7.20
a-30 7.49 7.40 b-31 5.10 7.00
a-31 5.00 6.00 b-32 5.50 5.50
a-32 5.90 5.90 b-33 5.00 5.00
a-33 5.00 4.00 b-34 5.90 5.90
a-34 5.00 5.00 b-35 5.90 5.90120 Jürgen Eichberger et al.
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Treatment A Treactment B
First-round Second-round First-round Second-round
Subject bid bid Subject bid bid
a-35 6.80 7.20 b-36 6.00 6.00
a-36 6.00 6.00 b-37 5.90 6.00
a-37 6.40 6.40 b-38 8.40 7.50
a-38 8.00 8.00 b-39 6.00 7.00
a-39 10.00 10.00 b-40 7.00 6.70
a-40 6.00 3.00
Treatment C
First round Second round
Subject Bid 1 Prize 1 Bid 2 Prize 2 Bid 1 Prize 1 Bid 2 Prize 2
c-1 6.10 — — — 6.10 — — —
c-2 7.00 — — — 7.90 — — —
c-4 5.90 — — — 8.90 — — —
c-5 6.91 — — — 7.39 — — —
c-6 8.50 7.49 8.50 — — —
c-7 6.90 — — — 8.00 — — —
c-8 6.00 — — — 6.00 — — —
c-9 6.00 — — — 5.00 — — —
c-10 9.00 5.00 7.00 — — —
c-11 9.90 1.00 — 9.90 1.80 —
c-12 6.00 — — — 6.50 — — —
c-13 8.00 4.00 8.00 — — —
c-14 8.00 5.00 8.00 — — —
c-15 8.50 5.00 7.50 — — —
c-16 6.00 — — — 6.00 — — —
c-17 8.00 4.40 10.00 2.40
c-18 6.00 3.00 — 6.00 3.00
c-19 8.60 4.50 7.50 6.60
c-20 8.00 4.00 8.00 4.00
c-21 8.50 4.50 8.50 5.00
c-22 6.00 3.00 — 6.00 3.00
c-23 7.50 7.50 7.50 4.00
c-24 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
c-25 5.10 4.90 5.20 1.10 —
c-26 7.50 2.50 — 7.00 3.00 —
c-27 7.50 6.00 — 9.00 2.50 — p p
p p
p p p
p p p p
p p p p
p p p
p p p p
p p p p
p p p p
p p p
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Treatment C
First round Second round
Subject Bid 1 Prize 1 Bid 2 Prize 2 Bid 1 Prize 1 Bid 2 Prize 2
c-28 5.90 3.00 — 5.90 4.90 —
c-29 8.00 4.00 — 9.00 3.70 —
c-30 6.00 2.50 — 6.00 2.50 —
c-31 5.90 4.90 — 8.90 4.00 —
c-32 6.00 3.00 — 6.00 3.00 —
c-33 7.00 6.00 — 8.00 5.00 —
c-34 9.90 5.90 — 10.00 5.00 —
c-35 9.00 3.10 — 9.00 3.10 —
c-36 7.80 5.00 — 8.00 5.00 —
c-37 8.00 5.00 — 3.50 6.50 —
c-38 8.00 5.00 — 8.00 5.00 —













Group 1 (earnings of all three treatments were actually paid)
First round
Subject Bid A Bid B Bid C1 Prize 1 Bid C2 Prize 2
1 5.00 5.00 9.00 5.00 —
2 5.00 6.00 9.00 4.00 —
3 5.10 6.10 6.10 3.20 —
4 8.40 7.60 8.90 4.00 —
5 6.50 6.00 10.00 4.00 —
6 6.00 7.00 8.00 4.90 —
7 6.00 6.80 6.00 2.60 —
8 5.00 10.00 10.00 5.00 —
9 7.50 7.00 9.80 5.50 —
10 5.00 10.00 7.50 7.50 —
11 5.00 9.80 9.80 8.20 —
12 5.00 7.00 9.90 4.90 —
13 6.00 6.00 9.00 3.00 —
14 2.50 5.00 6.00 5.00 —
15 5.00 6.00 10.00 5.00 —
















Subject Bid A Bid B Bid C1 Prize 1 Bid C2 Prize 2
17 10.00 1.00 8.50 5.00 —
18 5.10 5.90 8.50 6.00 —
19 8.00 8.00 7.00 5.00 —
20 9.00 6.00 6.00 4.00 —
Second round
Subject Bid A Bid B Bid C1 Prize 1 Bid C2 Prize 2
1 3.00 1.00 6.00 5.00
2 10.00 6.00 6.00 5.00
3 4.00 4.00 6.00 3.00 —
4 6.00 6.00 8.00 6.00
5 5.00 6.00 9.00 3.00 —
6 6.00 7.00 8.00 4.90 —
7 5.80 6.80 6.50 2.90 —
8 10.00 4.80 6.70 5.70
9 6.00 6.00 9.50 6.50
10 5.00 7.00 6.20 6.80
11 6.90 7.40 8.40 8.40
12 7.00 6.50 9.90 5.00
13 6.00 6.00 9.00 3.00
14 5.50 6.00 6.50 — — —
15 5.00 6.00 10.00 5.00
16 8.00 8.00 9.00 7.00
17 7.50 8.00 8.50 6.00
18 5.10 5.60 8.20 5.60
19 6.00 6.00 8.00 5.00
20 5.00 5.00 5.00 — — —
Group 2 (one randomly selected treatment was paid out)
First round
Subject Bid A Bid B Bid C1 Prize 1 Bid C2 Prize 2
1 6.00 6.00 6.00 3.00 —
2 6.00 6.00 6.00 3.00 —
3 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 —
4 6.50 6.80 8.00 4.00 —
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Subject Bid A Bid B Bid C1 Prize 1 Bid C2 Prize 2
6 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
7 6.80 6.80 7.20 7.20 —
8 5.10 5.10 5.00 4.00 —
9 7.00 7.00 7.00 3.00 —
10 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 —
11 6.00 6.00 8.00 6.00 —
12 5.90 5.00 5.90 5.00 —
13 7.50 7.50 7.00 3.50 —
14 6.59 7.99 7.99 7.99 —
15 7.00 7.00 8.00 1.00 —
16 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.00 —
17 5.50 6.00 6.90 3.30 —
18 7.81 4.71 9.80 6.11 —
19 4.90 4.70 4.70 5.00 —
20 6.80 6.80 6.80 5.00 —
Second round
Subject Bid A Bid B Bid C1 Prize 1 Bid C2 Prize 2
1 6.00 6.00 6.00 — — —
2 6.00 6.00 6.00 — — —
3 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
4 5.00 8.00 8.00 4.00 —
5 6.00 6.00 10.00 6.00 —
6 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
7 6.90 7.20 7.50 4.80 —
8 5.10 5.10 5.10 — — —
9 7.00 7.00 7.00 — — —
10 6.00 6.00 6.00 — — —
11 6.00 6.00 8.00 5.00 —
12 5.80 5.00 5.90 — — —
13 6.00 6.00 6.50 — — —
14 4.99 7.99 7.99 7.49
15 7.00 7.00 10.00 1.00 —
16 6.50 6.50 6.50 — — —
17 6.90 6.00 4.00 — — —
18 10.00 6.61 6.21 — — —
19 5.00 5.00 5.00 — — —
























Attitudes towards Risk: An Experiment 123
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003REFERENCES
Becker G. M., DeGroot M. H., Marschak J. (1964): “Measuring utility by a single response
sequential method”, Behavioral Science,9 ,p p. 226–32.
Bohm P., Linden J., Sonnegard J. (1997): “Eliciting reservation prices: Becker–DeGroot–
Marschak mechanisms vs. markets”, Economic Journal, 107, pp. 1079–89.
Camerer C. (1995): “Individual decision making”, in Kagel J. H., Roth A. E. (eds), The 
Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, ch. 8,
pp. 587–703.
Chateauneuf A., Cohen M. (1994): “Risk-seeking with diminishing marginal utility in a non-
expected utility model”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,9 ,p p. 77–91.
Chateauneuf A., Cohen M. (2000): “Choquet expected utility model: a new approach to indi-
vidual behavior under uncertainty and to social welfare”, in Grabisch M., Murofushi T.,
Sugeno M. (eds), Fuzzy Measures and Integrals: Theory and Applications,P h ysica-Verlag,
Heidelberg, New York, pp. 289–313.
Cubitt R. P., Starmer C., Sugden R. (1998a): “Dynamic choice and the common ratio effect: an
experimental investigation”, Economic Journal, 108, pp. 1362–80.
Cubitt R. P., Starmer C., Sugden R. (1998b): “On the validity of the random lottery incentive
system”, Experimental Economics,1 ,p p. 115–31.
von Neumann J., Morgenstern O. (1947): Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Quiggin J. (1982): “A theory of anticipated utility”, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization,3 ,p p. 323–43.
Rabin M. (2000): “Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: a calibration theorem”,
Econometrica, 68, pp. 1281–92.
Rothschild M., Stiglitz J. (1970): “Increasing risk: I. A deﬁnition”, Journal of Economic Theory,
2, pp. 225–43.
Samuelson W., Zeckhauser R. (1988): “Status quo bias in decision making”, Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty,1 ,p p. 7–59.
Tverski A., Kahneman D. (1992): “Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of
uncertainty”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,5 ,p p. 297–323.
124 Jürgen Eichberger et al.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003
Jürgen Eichberger
Department of Economics









Max Planck Institute for Research into
Economic Systems
Kahlaische Strasse 10
07745 Jena
Germany
E-mail: gueth@mpiew-jena.mpg.de
Wieland Müller
Department of Economics
Humboldt University Berlin
Spandauer Strasse 1
10178 Berlin
Germany
E-mail: wmueller@wiwi.hu-berlin.de